Abstract: This paper reports a duopoly experiment in which sellers compete for a potentially patient buyer. Each period sellers simultaneously post prices and the buyer costlessly observes either one or both prices. The buyer can then either accept an observed price or reject all offers. Following a rejection, sellers may have an opportunity to post prices again in another round. We study how the duopolists' pricing behavior responds to changes in the likelihood of the buyer observing multiple prices, , and the probability of continuing to another round, . The unique stationary equilibrium features mixed strategies. Consistent with the equilibrium, observed prices are decreasing in and . Contrary to the equilibrium, however, buyers sometimes reject profitable price offers and average prices are lower than predicted when only one round of offers is possible, and higher than predicted in the multiple-round game.
Introduction
Two extreme forms of pricing behavior -sometimes called the Bertrand Paradox and the Diamond Paradox -emerge from a single distinguishing assumption. Bertrand (1883) assumes that a buyer knows ex ante the prices of all sellers, and notes that with homogeneous goods a single competitive price emerges even amongst a small number of sellers because at any slightly higher price at least one seller can increase his profit by engaging in undercutting. In Diamond's (1971) model, on the other hand, a buyer first chooses a seller and then receives the price quote ex post. Even with infinitesimal search cost, in equilibrium buyer searches only one seller and all sellers charge the monopoly price. The only difference between the two formulations is whether sellers price ex ante or ex post.
1 Intuitively however, there is no strong rationale for preferring either assumption for when price information is acquired. This is especially so since the 'law of one price' is known to fail, and persistent price dispersion is widely observed even in essentially homogenous goods markets (e.g. Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000, Sorensen 2000 , and Baye,
Morgan and Scholten 2004).
Most of the theoretical literature that models price dispersion has employed costly buyer search (e.g., Stigler 1961; Stiglitz 1977, 1982; Stahl 1989 Stahl , 1996 or costly seller advertising (Butters 1977; Robert and Stahl, 1993) to generate dispersed prices. 2 Gale (1988) , on the other hand, models price dispersion in its starkest form. In his model with two sellers and one buyer, sellers are uncertain whether the buyer is receiving price offers from both (ex ante pricing) or one (ex post pricing) of them at any given time. If the buyer's sample contains both offers with a positive but not certain probability γ, a unique dispersed price equilibrium exists that shifts systematically with γ. Extending this static model to multi-round pricing with time discounting, Gale examines the impact of buyer patience on equilibrium prices and price dispersion. This is intended to approximate market conditions with many buyers where trade continues over time. As buyers become more patient, sellers must compete not only with the other seller but also with their own future price offers, and consequently, the equilibrium price distribution becomes concentrated at lower prices.
In this paper we present the first laboratory experiment that studies the interaction of multiround pricing, buyer patience and search. Specifically, we focus on multi-round pricing strategy adopted by competing sellers in a noisy search environment where buyers can wait for more price offers. The experiment includes both a static treatment, where agents have only one opportunity to trade each period, and a dynamic treatment where trading opportunities may continue for future rounds of price offers with a positive and known probability, δ. Our results support the Gale (1988) model's comparative statics predictions. In particular, prices decrease as the likelihood of the buyer observing multiple prices (γ) increases and as the buyer's patience level (δ) increases. Prices do not reach the extreme levels predicted for the highest γ and δ treatment, however, indicating that the buyers in the experiment do not take full advantage of their market power. Average transaction prices are also lower than predicted when only one round of offers is possible, and higher than predicted in the multiple-round game. Furthermore, contrary to the stationary equilibrium, buyers sometimes reject profitable price offers.
Our experiment contributes to a line of research exploring buyers' strategic behavior (e.g., Normann, Ruffle and Snyder, 2007) . Posted-offer experiments overwhelmingly focus on seller pricing behavior, often controlling for potential influences of human buyers by replacing them with computer algorithms. These robot buyers are pre-programmed to search according to an equilibrium reservation price strategy; by contrast, human buyers' expectations and behavior respond to observed non-equilibrium prices. In the present study we explore the counteracting role of this (human) buyer strategic behavior, and the resulting implications for sellers' pricing.
Our results are consistent with the previous few studies that included both simulated and human buyers, which have concluded that the presence of human buyers has a disciplining effect on sellers' pricing behavior (Davis and Williams, 1991; Cason and Friedman, 2003; Mago, 2010) .
It is well established that in a single-round buyer-seller interaction, adding uncertainty regarding the sample size of price offers available to the buyer affects seller pricing (Burdett and Judd, 1983) . When buyer-seller interaction can potentially extend to multiple rounds, however, the buyer's ability to reject initial price offers also becomes important (Gale, 1988) . In equilibrium, sellers offer prices that are attractive to buyers in the first round, so they will not have any incentive to defer purchase to later offer rounds. In practice, however, buyers may nevertheless reject profitable initial price offers in anticipation of lower future prices. Sellers may anticipate the strategic benefits of buyers' ability to wait, and post lower initial prices to avoid demand withholding and induce buyers to purchase early. 3 Yet another possibility is that multi-round pricing allows sellers to engage in inter-temporal price discrimination and extract greater surplus from impatient or risk averse buyers (similar to the "buy it now" option available on eBay). Our experiment explores how buyers time their purchases and sellers choose their prices to systematically influence the dynamics of transaction prices. These within-period dynamics are not captured by the stationary equilibrium of the theoretical model since in equilibrium all transactions occur in the first round. To the best of our knowledge, our experiment is the first to consider such intertemporal pricing predictions with competing sellers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes how both the static and dynamic versions of the model relate to some of the existing literature. Section 3 presents the model details and our testable hypotheses. Section 4 describes the experimental design and procedures. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes.
Related Literature
Gale's static model can be viewed as a simplified version of Burdett and Judd's (1983) noisy search model. In both models, the equilibrium price distribution is truly dispersed, i.e., it has a positive density over a non-trivial range of prices for most parameter values of the likelihood of the buyer observing multiple prices, but for extreme values the distribution degenerates into a unified competitive or a unified monopoly price. Cason and Friedman (2003) test Burdett and Judd model in a laboratory experiment, and similar to our study, observe that seller prices are decreasing in the probability that buyers observe more than one price offer. The main difference between the two studies lies in the mechanism that generates demand uncertainty. In Cason and
Friedman, the driving force behind price dispersion is costly buyer search whereas in our setup, search is not costly but there is an exogenous likelihood that the buyer observes multiple prices.
Another new feature of the present experiment is the dynamic aspect of multiple rounds of price offers in a noisy search environment. Our dynamic treatment draws on the literature on durable goods monopoly and sequential bargaining where the focus is on the implications of (potential) repeated purchase opportunities on market outcomes. Central to the durable goods framework is the Coase conjecture -if goods are durable, then in equilibrium the monopolist 3 Engle-Warnick and Ruffle (2005) report that these forces emerge when even a monopolist seller is confronted with a small number of buyers. They refer to potential buyer withholding as the "buyer withholding hypothesis" and seller's response to the implicit threat as the "cautious monopolist hypothesis".
seller's initial price offer falls as the discount factor rises and it converges to marginal cost as the discount factor approaches unity (Coase 1972 , Stokey 1981 , Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson 1986 . 4 Laboratory studies that have examined equilibrium predictions of these models (e.g., Rapoport, Erev and Zwick 1995; Reynolds 2000; Cason and Sharma 2001) provide mixed support for the Coase conjecture. With the exception of Cason and Sharma (2001) , these studies find that initial price offers are higher for higher discount factors. In the present study we find that initial price offers decrease as discount factor increases. This indicates that the threat of demand withholding (which increases the likelihood that other seller's price is observed) further magnifies seller competition to induce lower prices. Thus, our results provide empirical evidence consistent with the spirit of the Coase conjecture in a competing seller environment.
We can also draw parallels between our study and the ultimatum game with proposer competition. For example, Abbink et al. (2000) consider a 'competitive ultimatum game': three proposers take turns to make an offer to split a surplus with a single responder. If the responder accepts the first offer, the game ends. Otherwise, the second proposer makes an offer; and in the third stage, the game resembles the standard ultimatum game. They find that competition pushes the first and second proposers to offer, on average, more than half the available surplus. Gneezy , Haruvy and Roth (2003) argue that proposer competition not only strengthens the bargaining position of the responder, but it also dilutes the notion of altruism and equity. 5 The intuitive analog for our setup is that seller competition yields lower prices, especially if competition can extend over multiple rounds.
Our study is also related to bilateral bargaining models with complete-and incompleteinformation. In his seminal article, Rubinstein (1982) assumes that time is divided into discrete periods and bargainers alternate in making offers and counteroffers. The incentive to agree to early offers arises from the opportunity cost of delay, such that the value of potential agreement shrinks according to a discount factor. In equilibrium, bargaining is resolved immediately with no delay at all. This result is similar to the equilibrium prediction in the present model that all transactions occur in the first round. Experimental studies in the Rubinstein complete information bargaining environment indicate that agents do respond to changes in bargaining power, such as those due to changes in the discount factor, but that their response is incomplete and splits of the bargaining surplus are biased towards equality (Roth, 1995) . This has been attributed to concerns about fairness of bargaining outcomes (e.g., Goeree and Holt, 2000) .
Bargaining models that incorporate incomplete information, on the other hand, formalize the notion that bargaining is a process of communication, and that communicating private information credibly via a sequence of offers and counteroffers can result in a delay in reaching the agreement (Kennan and Wilson, 1993 
Theoretical Model
Consider a homogenous goods market where two identical sellers compete to supply an indivisible unit of the good to a single buyer. The buyer's maximum willingness to pay for the good is normalized to 1, while sellers' marginal cost of production is normalized to zero.
Both sellers simultaneously announce the price they offer for the good [0,1] 1, 2 i p i ∈ = and the buyer receives a random sample of the sellers' posted prices. The sample contains both prices with probability 0 and one randomly selected price with probability 1 . When only one price is displayed, the probability that a particular seller's price offer is displayed to the buyer is one-half. The sellers are uncertain whether the buyer is receiving offers from one or both of them in any given round. If the buyer sees one price, she can either accept the offer or refuse to trade.
Similarly, if the buyer sees both prices, she can either accept one of the two offers or refuse to trade. The payoff of the successful seller is the traded price , the buyer's payoff is 1 and the other seller receives a payoff of zero.
The concept of equilibrium we employ is that of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Gale (1988) show that there exists a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium given by the price distribution · , which is also symmetric i.e. .
Theorem 1 (Gale, 1988 Note that as 1, that is, as the probability that the buyer sees both prices increases, the equilibrium price distribution converges to the perfectly competitive price of 0 . Likewise, as 0, that is, as the probability that the buyer sees only one price increases, the equilibrium price distribution converges to the monopoly price of 1 .
6
This simple game is somewhat unrealistic because of its one-shot nature. For instance, if the buyer sees the price of only one seller, she does not get an opportunity to visit the other seller.
Furthermore, if the buyer refuses the seller offer(s) the entire surplus is lost and no opportunity exists for additional price offers. To address this, Gale also considers a dynamic version where time is divided into discrete rounds 1,2,3 …). At 1, both sellers set their prices. As before, with probability 0 buyer sees prices posted by both sellers and with probability 1 buyer sees only one randomly selected price. If the buyer accepts a price offer, the game ends. But if buyer refuses the offer(s), then with a continuation probability 0 1 sellers have another opportunity to post prices. That is, for any round 1 the game proceeds to round 1 with probability . In the next round, both sellers again set their prices while the buyer sees one or both price offer(s). The game proceeds in this manner until the buyer accepts an offer.
The likelihood of the buyer seeing one or both prices in round is stochastically independent from the same likelihood in round 1. All agents are also assumed to be indifferent between payoff of one unit in round and one unit in round 1. In each round sellers only know their own posted price, their individual pricing history and whether or not trade has occurred. A seller does not learn the pricing history of the other seller. Similarly, the buyer can only recall the 6 Abrams, Sefton and Yavas (2000) and Gale (1988) refer to these boundary cases as the Bertrand paradox ( 0) and the Diamond paradox ( 1 .
previously observed prices and does not observe the sellers' complete pricing history.
As is common in the literature, we can interpret the above model to be one in which payoffs of all players shrinks according to a commonly known discount factor, , and the game proceeds to the next round with probability one. This interpretation of the continuation probability as the discount factor implies that if a buyer accepts an offer at time round then her payoff is 1 , the payoff of the successful seller is while the other seller receives zero. As before, if the buyer does not accept any price offer, all agents receive zero. Gale (1988) proves the following result.
Theorem 2 (Gale, 1988 The equilibrium price distribution in the dynamic version of the game (Theorem 2) is similar to the equilibrium price distribution in the one-shot version (Theorem 1), with the exception that the maximum reservation price is 1 in the case of time discounting rather than 1. The analysis concerning the limiting case of , the probability of observing both price offers, is also similar to the one-shot version. More specifically, for a given value of , the buyer's payoff, , is monotonically increasing in . Thus, as 1, the equilibrium price distribution converges to the competitive price of 0 .
Conversely, as 0, the equilibrium price distribution converges to the monopoly price of 1 and the buyer's payoff decreases to zero.
Another important comparative static result concerns , the discount factor or the continuation probability. For any fixed value of (or equivalently, for any fixed value of ),
This implies that irrespective of the probability of observing both prices, as the continuation probability increases, the equilibrium price distribution converges to the competitive price of 0 and buyer's payoff converges to the maximum possible surplus of 1. In other words, when the buyer can wait indefinitely for a better offer, sellers lose their bargaining power and competitive forces drive the equilibrium price to zero. Thus, the interplay of buyer's patience and its impact on sellers' strategy leads to a more competitive pricing structure. Note that although this result is similar to Coase conjecture in spirit, where buyer patience also leads to competitive prices even under a monopoly market structure, the underlying cause differs in the two settings. Specifically, to obtain competitive equilibrium prices as 1, the Coase conjecture requires that at least some buyers place a very low valuation on the good.
Finally, note that the buyer's threat to wait is not credible, and in the subgame perfect equilibrium she buys in the first round. Thus, buyer's bargaining position cannot be solely attributed to the discount factor or her patience level. As Gale (1988, pg. 736) notes, "the role of the patient buyer is simply to rob the sellers of the minimal degree of uncertainty about prices that is necessary to prevent them from engaging in cutthroat competition." 7 As mentioned at the end of the introduction, however, the complete information environment that leads to the firstround purchases may not hold with human traders who have private information about their own risk and social preferences. Moreover, first-round purchases may not occur in nonstationary equilibria, which are intractable in this environment. These considerations provide further motivation for gathering empirical evidence through this experiment. Table 1 summarizes the parameter values used in the experiment and the theoretical predictions for the stationary equilibrium in the various treatments. Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium price distribution for the chosen parameters. We shall compare our laboratory market outcomes to the quantitative predictions shown in the table, but based on the previous experimental results we do not expect strong, quantitative predictions to hold very precisely.
Therefore our analysis will focus on the comparative statics predictions summarized by the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: An increase in the probability of observing prices of both sellers results in lower prices.
Hypothesis 2: An increase in the continuation probability results in lower prices.
Experimental Design and Procedures

Experimental Design
Each market comprises 2 sellers and 1 buyer. We employ the standard posted offer institution to focus on price competition. The experiment employs a 2×2 design with two treatment variables -probability of the buyer observing price offers from both sellers (γ) and continuation probability (δ). We vary the continuation probability within sessions and the probability of observing multiple prices across sessions. Table 2 presents the experimental design. In sessions referred to as "High-Low," sellers face a high continuation probability (δ = 0.9) in the first 30 periods, and a low continuation probability (δ = 0) in the next 30 periods. To control for order effects, this order is reversed in the four "Low-High" sessions. The probability of buyer observing both offers is varied at 2 levels: γ = 0.67 and γ = 0.33. Our design identifies the effect of a change in γ through across-session comparisons and the effect of a change in δ through within-session comparisons. As is common in the literature on duopoly experiments, to limit repeated game effects and to reduce the incentives for collusive behavior, we randomly re-match subjects into new markets each period.
Note that δ = 0 represents the static game where agents have only one opportunity to trade.
The treatment with δ = 0.9, on the other hand, represents the dynamic game where it is not necessary to trade immediately. Our choice of δ = 0.9 was motivated by two considerations.
First, it has been widely employed in prior literature on buyer-seller negotiations and sequential bargaining (for e.g., Rapoport, Erev and Zwick 1995 , Cason and Sharma 2001 , Srivastava 2001 ).
Second, it provides a benchmark for an extreme case of buyer patience. For a given γ, the expected range of posted prices does not overlap when δ = 0 compared to when δ = 0.9 (cf Figure 1 ).
Experimental Procedures
We report results from eight experimental sessions conducted at the Vernon Smith
Experimental Economics Laboratory at Purdue University. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . A total of 96 subjects participated in the experiment, all of whom were recruited by e-mail from the undergraduate student population. No subject participated in more than one session, although some had participated in other economics experiments that were unrelated to this research. Upon arrival, subjects were seated randomly at visually-isolated computers. Each received a set of written instructions and record sheets (included in the Appendix). Instructions were read aloud at the beginning of the experimental session, and new instructions pertaining to the second treatment were read at the beginning of the second sequence. Since these instructions were read aloud, we assume that the information they contain was common knowledge. Throughout the session no communication between subjects was permitted and all choices and information were transmitted via the computers. At the end of the session, subjects were paid in cash by converting their total profits from experimental dollars into US dollars at a privately known fixed rate. This conversion rate differed for buyers and sellers. Sessions lasted about 105 minutes and subject payments averaged about $25 each.
The 12 subjects in each session were divided into 4 markets, with two sellers and one buyer in each market. The subjects were randomly assigned the role of either a buyer or a seller and their role remain unchanged for the entire session. The random matching process involved both types of agents; i.e., in each period there was a new random allocation of buyers and sellers to each market. Both sellers had the same homogenous good whose cost of production was normalized to zero. The buyer demanded at most one unit, and received a resale value of 100 experimental dollars if they purchased this unit. In all treatments, sellers were not allowed to post a price above this commonly known reservation price. To bring the laboratory environment closer to its field counterpart and to the theoretical model with continuous prices, we allow for a fine grid of prices (i.e., prices up to 2 decimal points).
Each session proceeded through a sequence of 60 trading periods. In the δ = 0.9 treatment a period could last multiple rounds and was terminated if either (a) buyer accepts a price offer or (b) period was terminated randomly using a die roll. To implement our continuation probability, at the end of every round if the buyer refused to purchase at the offered price(s), the computer threw a "virtual" 10-sided die. If the outcome of the die roll was a 10, then the period ended immediately; otherwise the period continued to an additional round of seller price offers within the same period.
In every round both sellers post a price. With a pre-determined probability known to all subjects (γ = 0.33 and γ = 0.67) the buyer sees either one or both price offers. Each seller's price is equally likely to be displayed to the buyer. The buyer then makes the "accept" or "reject" purchase decision. To be consistent with the theory, at the end of each trading round, sellers receive individual feedback on their market -their own price, their profit and whether buyer accepted any price offer. They do not learn the price of the other seller. Similarly, buyer's information is limited to the observed price offers and their profit from the transaction. At the end of each period, however, agents learn prices offered by both sellers in all rounds of the current period and also which price(s) the buyer observed in each round. Subjects are then randomly re-matched for the next period.
Results
We divide the results into four subsections. Section 5.1 presents a summary of the transaction prices. Section 5.2 reports the tests of the comparative static predictions and compares prices to the equilibrium distribution. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 examine the buyer purchase behavior and seller pricing behavior, respectively.
Overview
We have a panel dataset of price and purchase decisions made by 96 subjects across 60 periods for 8 independent sessions. Table 3 reports the median and mean transaction prices for each session. In all sessions, aggregate price behavior exhibits the predicted pattern and appears to conform to the model's comparative statics predictions. Overall, prices tend to be lower than predicted when buyers and sellers have only one opportunity to make a transaction (δ = 0) and higher than predicted when a period may last multiple rounds (δ = 0.9). The fact that prices in move in accordance to the directional prediction of the model is also illustrated in Figures 2-5.
These figures present the time series of median transaction prices in each session for different γ and δ combinations.
The fact that prices are not as extreme as predicted by the theory indicates that the buyers did not take full advantage of their monopsony position. There seems to be no hysteresis effect arising from the conditions of the previous treatment/sequence ordering, but the time trend for these prices is fairly substantial.
8 With the exception of the δ = 0, γ = 0.33 treatment, prices tend to decline over time as is commonly observed in other posted offer experiments. We are interested in testing equilibrium predictions, so in the formal hypothesis tests below we exclude the first 15 periods of each treatment run, since in these periods subjects are learning about the market and the incentives they face. We therefore employ 30 out of 60 total periods for these tests: periods 16-30 (sequence 1) and periods 46-60 (sequence 2).
Comparative Statics and Equilibrium Comparison
Result 1: Median and mean transaction prices decrease as the probability of observing both prices increases (support for Hypothesis 1). Table 3 When δ = 0.9, shown in the right half of Table 3 , there is a slight overlap in the distributions of the transaction prices, but independent across-session comparisons using the Mann-Whitney test still rejects the null hypothesis of no treatment effect in favor of the alternative hypothesis that an increase in the probability of observing prices of both sellers results in lower prices at the 5-percent significance level.
Support:
In addition to these simple unconditional nonparametric tests, we can make statistical inferences using panel data econometric methods that model the correlation of observations (and errors) due to the repeated measures drawn from the same set of subjects. These multivariate random effects regression models include clustering on sessions, order dummies to capture the sequence ordering effects, and 1/period to capture the time trend. Thus, for a given continuation probability δ, the subject level random effect regression equation is is subject 's price in period = 1 if probability of seeing multiple prices is higher ( = 0.67) is an sequence order dummy is the composite error term.
The detailed regression results are omitted to save space and because they provide conclusions analogous to the non-parametric results: the null hypothesis that prices are the same across different γ treatments is rejected at any conventional level of significance. Prices are lower when the probability of buyer seeing multiple price offers is higher, both for δ = 0 (t-statistic = -2.91, p-value <0.01) and for δ = 0.9 (t-statistic = -2.62, p-value <0.01).
Result 2: Median and mean transaction prices decrease as the continuation probability increases (support for Hypothesis 2).
Support: Our design varied the continuation probability within sessions. Since subjects made decisions under both δ = 0 and δ = 0.9 treatments in each session, with the treatment order varied, we can construct statistically independent pairwise differences for each session to conduct conservative non-parametric sign tests and signed rank tests. For example, in session 1, the mean price when δ = 0 is 18.21 and when δ = 0.9 is 9.25 (Table 1) , and so the difference of 8.96 is one of the four pairwise differences when γ = 0.67. Since all four pairwise differences are positive for both values of γ, sign tests reject the null hypothesis of no continuation probability treatment effect (one-tailed p-value=0.03). Pooling observations in the two γ treatments increases the sample size to 8, which is sufficient to conduct a nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test.
The 8 positive differences for each price summary statistic leads to a test statistic value of 2.52, which is significant at the 1-percent level. Finally, random effects regression models similar to those described above also support the conclusion that prices are lower when the period can last multiple rounds, both for γ = 0.67 (t-statistic = -6.51, p-value < 0 .01) and for γ = 0.33 (t-statistic = -2.70, p-value <0.01).
Result 3: Prices are lower than predicted when traders have only one opportunity to make a transaction (δ = 0), and higher than predicted when a period may last multiple rounds (δ = 0.9).
The model predicts price dispersion as the outcome of a mixed strategy equilibrium. To compare prices to this equilibrium, we construct an empirical price distribution using aggregate data (across sessions, within a treatment) for the late 15 periods. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the theoretical and the empirical cumulative price distributions for both levels of continuation probability. In both cases the changes in the distribution are in the directions predicted by the theoretical model. However, when δ = 0 ( Figure 6 ) the equilibrium price distribution first order stochastically dominates the empirical distribution, with mean prices of 18.66 vs. 23.1 in the γ = 0.67 treatment and 44.23 vs. 56.8 in the γ = 0.33 treatment. The lower bound of the empirical distribution is also far below that predicted by the model. Conversely, observed transaction prices tend to be higher than predicted when the continuation probability is high, as shown in 
Buyer Purchase Behavior
When a period lasts only one round (δ = 0), demand withholding is not a rational strategy for any buyer. 9 Accordingly, we find only seven instances of demand withholding across 480 buyer purchase decisions (1.5 percent) when buyers observe prices of both sellers with probability γ = 0.67. However, when the buyer is less likely to see both price offers (i.e., γ = 0.33), no-trade occurs about 7.3 percent of the time.
The more interesting case is when a period may last for multiple rounds (δ = 0.9). In equilibrium, a buyer cannot credibly threaten to wait and should purchase in round 1. Offequilibrium, however, a buyer who has the option to defer purchase until later may wait for better price offers even though the current offer(s) yield positive payoff. Figure 8 shows that in 9 Rejection of a price offer that would provide the buyer a positive payoff is termed 'demand withholding.' BrownKruse (1991) and Reynolds (2000) report examples of demand withholding in contestable and posted offer markets, respectively. the δ = 0.9 sessions, on average, more than 30 percent of the transactions occur in later rounds, with little difference across to the two γ treatments. However, despite deferring purchase to later rounds, nearly all exchanges eventually do occur in the δ = 0.9 treatment. No-trade occurs 5 percent of the time in γ = 0.33 treatment and 3.54 percent of the time in γ = 0.67 treatment, leading to overall efficiency that is similar to the δ = 0 treatment.
To explore buyer purchase behavior more systematically we use panel data econometric models with subject level error clustering. Table 4 reports the marginal effects of probit models for purchase decisions in round 1 by all buyers. The likelihood of purchasing in round 1 is higher when a buyer observes both price offers or when the (minimum) observed price is lower.
Accounting for past experience (column 2) indicates that buyers who made their purchase early last period are more likely to accept price offers in round 1, and the likelihood of making a round 1 purchase in the current period is increasing in transaction price paid in the previous period.
Consistent with Figure 8 , we find that the probability of purchasing in round 1 does not depend on the probability of observing one or both prices (γ).
Most of these results also hold when focusing exclusively on buyers who reveal themselves to be 'patient.' We define a buyer to be patient if she refuses round 1 price offers at least 33 percent of the time-that is, at least 5 times in the last 15 periods. 10 Table 4 reports a sole exception is that these buyers are less likely to purchase in round 1 in the treatment with a higher likelihood of receiving two price offers (γ=0.67). Similar behavior for the patient and impatient buyers may be one reason why exhibiting patience does not increase buyer profit. We find no difference between the profits earned by patient buyers and by those who more frequently accept the initial price offers (p-value = 0.9).
Recall that in equilibrium, the buyer's threat to defer purchase is not credible, and price offers made in round 1 are always accepted. The predictive power of theory, however, is based on a number of strong assumptions that may not hold in practice. For instance, buyers in the experiment may hold imprecise beliefs because they face an endogenous price distribution that is both unknown and unstable. An assessment of the optimality of buyer purchase behavior should therefore account for the actual price draws the buyer can receive. Rejecting the initial price offer should be regarded as optimal if the expected benefit from delay (expected decrease in price from deferring purchase to round 2) exceeds the cost of delay (expected profit from accepting price offer in round 1×(1-δ)). Since more than 85 percent of the transactions occurred in the first 2 rounds (cf. Figure 8) , we restrict our analysis to actual price draws a buyer could have received in rounds 1 and 2. To account for evolution of prices over time, we base this expected value on an historical three-period moving average.
Next, we compare actual purchase decision in round 1 to the (approximately) optimal rule. When buyers purchase decision is not optimal, it is useful to divide their mistakes into 2 types of errors: Type 1 error (Buyers did not reject the initial offer when they should have; i.e., expected decrease in price in round 2 is more than the cost of delay) and Type 2 error (Buyers rejected the initial offer when they should have purchased in round 1; i.e., expected decrease in price in round 2 is less than the cost of delay). Table 5 presents the optimal purchase comparisons for decisions made in round 1 of each period. For both γ treatments, more than 70 percent of the purchase decisions are optimal. Errors that occur more commonly take the form of Type 1 error rather than Type 2 error. This bias towards accepting the initial offers too quickly may stem from risk aversion among buyers.
Seller Pricing Behavior
When agents have only one opportunity to trade (δ = 0), buyers do not have the strategic incentive to withhold demand. Therefore, analysis of the prices posted by sellers closely mirrors the transaction prices analysis documented in Section 5.2. In particular, random effects regression results show that sellers respond predictably to an increase in the likelihood of buyer receiving multiple price offers -by lowering their price offers (t-statistic = -2.79, p-value < 0.01).
The more interesting case is when additional purchase opportunities may be available to the buyer (δ = 0.9). To begin with, it is important to understand the impact that potential demand withholding has on the initial price offers made by the sellers, as this likely determines the buyer purchase decision as well as the path of subsequent offers. Comparing across the two δ treatments, regression results show that initial price offers made by the sellers are lower when the probability of continuation is higher, both for γ = 0.33 (t-statistic = -2.48, one-tailed p-value < 0.01) and for γ = 0.67 (t-statistic = -1.76, one-tailed p-value = 0.04). This suggests that sellers account for buyers' strategic ability to withhold demand and accordingly post lower initial prices to induce them to purchase early. Despite these lower prices however, demand withholding is Table 6A indicates that when the transaction occurs in round 2, the median prices posted by the sellers in rounds 1 and 2 are 18 and 13.74 respectively. These prices illustrate the general tendency for price offers to fall as the period progresses over multiple rounds. Random effect regressions that include clustering on sessions, time trend and order fixed effects provide statistical support for this observation (for 1/round: t-statistic = 3.7 and p-value < 0.01). Also note that the average price offer in round 1 increases for periods in which the transaction occurs in a later round, indicating that buyers are rejecting higher offers and are accepting lower offers in round 1. In general, these patterns of posted prices suggest that some sellers used the multiple rounds of price offers to practice intertemporal price discrimination. 11,12 However, random effect regressions analyzing individual seller profit (not shown) show that these attempts at discrimination are largely unsuccessful. price offers seems to oversample higher prices, often beyond the equilibrium range. The unaccepted price offers tend to be higher than the accepted price offers, of course, but the 11 Bayer (2010) also finds that seller competition fails to prevent intertemporal price discrimination, and although overall transaction prices are lower in a duopoly compared to a monopoly, the decrease is by far less than predicted. 12 Most of the experimental literature on intertemporal price discrimination centers on a durable goods monopoly. In the theoretical literature, existence of discrimination in competitive markets is attributed to factors such as group purchases (Locay and Rodriquez 1992) , advance purchases (Gale, 1993) price rigidities and demand uncertainty (Dana, 1998) .
proportion of unsold offers declines over time as posted (and transaction) prices decrease and buyers make their purchase in round 1.
Conclusion
Theoretical research has shown that equilibria in oligopoly pricing games are sensitive to subtle information conditions, the timing of moves, and the patience of buyers and sellers. Gale
(1988) provides a simple and elegant model that captures the interplay between buyers' patience to wait for additional price offers and sellers' beliefs about how many offers the buyers observe in different rounds. These factors determine how closely the unique mixed strategy pricing equilibrium approximates competitive (Bertrand) or monopoly (Diamond) levels. This approach is insightful because it provides a modeling foundation for the multilateral bargaining process that can occur in concentrated intermediate goods markets common in industrial procurement, contracting services, and many other markets. It also provides an equilibrium explanation for persistent price dispersion observed in relatively homogenous product markets, which could arise in part from strategic buyer behavior. Even in restrictive posted offer settings, where buyers are limited to accepting or rejecting prices offers, 'patient' buyers forego myopically profitable purchases with the intent of forcing sellers to lower prices in the future. Accounting for this strategic behavior could be important for antitrust policy, which should consider how concentrated industry structure on the selling side may be counterbalanced by the presence of a small number of strategic buyers.
This paper provides an assessment of the implications of buyer patience and its interaction with their noisy search. We use highly controlled laboratory markets that manipulate the expected number of price offers shown to buyers and their likelihood of receiving future offers.
Consistent with the model's comparative static predictions, price offers decrease when buyers are more likely to receive multiple price offers and when they become more patient. The equilibrium point predictions of the model are not supported, however, since transaction prices are greater than predicted in the multi-round (dynamic) treatments and are lower than predicted in the single-round (static) treatments.
These results provide insight that should be useful for developing more accurate models of pricing, bargaining, and other aspects of market behavior under incomplete information. For example, the model over-predicts the ability of buyers to obtain low, near-competitive prices Probability of observing both price offers γ = 0.67 (high) and γ = 0.33 (low) Continuation probability δ = 0.9 (high) and δ = 0 (low) 
Appendix: Experiment Instructions
General
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you can earn a considerable amount of money that will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. It is in your best interest to fully understand the instructions, so feel free to ask any questions at any time. It is important that you do not talk or discuss your information with other participants in the room until the session is over.
All transactions in today's experiment will be in Experimental Dollars. These Experimental Dollars will be converted to real US Dollars at the end of the experiment, at a rate of __ Experimental Dollars = $1. This conversion rate is your own private information and it may be different from other participants' conversion rates. Notice that the more experimental dollars you earn, the more US dollars you earn. What you earn depends partly on your decisions and partly on decisions of others.
In this experiment, we are going to conduct markets in which you will be a participant in a sequence of market trading periods. The experiment consists of 2 sequences, where each sequence will consist of 30 periods each. The instructions for each sequence will be given at the start of that sequence.
In every period, you will be either a buyer or a seller of a fictitious good X, and you will remain in this role throughout the experiment. The 12 participants in today's experiment will be randomly re-matched every period into 4 markets with 2 sellers and 1 buyer in each market.
Therefore, the other traders in your market will change randomly after each period. Buyers earn money from buying a single unit of good X, and Sellers earn money from selling a single unit of good X.
Buyers
Exactly one buyer will participate in each separate market, and this buyer can purchase at most one unit of good X per trading period. A buyer who purchases a unit of X earns money by reselling this unit to the experimenter at a set price of 100. The profits from each resale are computed by taking the difference between the resale value of 100 and the price paid for the unit.
That is, Buyers who do not buy a unit automatically earn a profit of zero that period.
Sellers
Two sellers will participate in each separate market. Each seller is endowed with a single unit of good X, i.e. it costs a seller nothing to produce good X. Since the buyer will buy only one unit of X per period, it follows that only one seller can make the sale per trading period. The seller who makes the sale earns profit equal to the sale price of the unit, and the seller who is unable to make the sale earns zero profit. Suppose, for example, that you sell a unit at a price of 37. Your earnings are 37 while the other seller in your market earns 0.
Buying and Selling Procedures for Sequence 1
At the beginning of the period, sellers post their offer prices, indicating the amount they wish to receive to sell their unit of good X, using a decision screen as shown in Figure 1 on the next page. Price must be greater than or equal to 0 (the cost of the unit) and less than or equal to 100
(the buyers' resale value). Up to two decimal places are allowed in setting these price offers. Thus, 3.69, 45.01, 96.35 are all acceptable prices.
After both sellers have posted their prices, the buyer will decide whether he or she wants to buy the unit at the offered price or prices. The buyer will sometimes observe price offers of both sellers in his or her market, as shown on Figure 2 . Other times the buyer will only observe one (randomly-chosen) price offer chosen by one of the sellers in his or her market, as shown on Figure 3 . There is a 2/3 chance that the buyer sees only one price and a 1/3 chance that the buyer sees both price offers. This probability is also displayed on the computerized decision screens as shown in Figures 1 -3 . These probabilities mean that about one-third of the time buyers will see both price offers. The chance of observing one or two prices does not depend on whether one or two prices were shown recently, or on any other activity in any market. It is completely random. The buyer indicates whether he or she wants to purchase a unit, and from which seller (if two price offers are available), by clicking the Accept or Reject buttons on their decision screen (Figures 2 or 3) .
Length of a period in Sequence 1
Each period will last for one or more rounds depending on the decisions made by the participants in the experiment as well as a roll of die, as described below.
In every period, once all buyers in the experiment have had an opportunity to purchase a unit in the first round, the experiment will continue onto the next period if all buyers bought a unit.
If any buyer has not yet purchased, the current period may be extended to a second round of seller price offers. To determine whether or not a second round occurs, first the computer will check whether any buyer has not yet purchased in the current period. If any buyer has not yet purchased, then the computer will throw a "virtual" 10-sided die (see Figure 4) . If the die comes out 10, the period ends immediately and we move on to the next period. If the 10-sided die roll comes up with anything except 10, then we continue with an additional round of seller price offers within the same period. Thus, there is a 9/10 chance that we will move to another round of offers within the same period if not all buyers have purchased yet. Sellers who are in a market where the buyer has already purchased cannot make a price offer in this next round. However, sellers who are in a market where the buyer has not already purchased will make price offers as described above. The round then continues onto the buyer purchase decisions as described above. If all buyers make the purchase in the second round, we move on to the next period.
However, if there is any buyer who has not yet purchased, the current period may be extended to a third round of seller price offers as long as the roll of a die does not come up with 10. This process continues and the number of rounds could go on indefinitely (as long as 10 doesn't come up a die roll) when buyers don't purchase. Thus, it could go on 2, 3, 6, 8, 10 or more rounds.
Note that in each new round the buyer will again randomly observe either one or two prices.
The chance of seeing one or two prices is not affected by the participant's previous decisions or by whether or not two prices were displayed in the previous round. Note that the two sellers' prices are randomly shuffled each round to determine which is shown on the left and right.
Recall that each time the experiment moves onto another period, the sellers and buyers will be randomly re-shuffled into new three-person groups to form new markets. At the beginning of a new period, sellers start over again with 1 unit of good X that they can sell, and buyers can again purchase 1 (and only 1) unit. Each period proceeds in an identical fashion. • Each buyer can buy up to 1 unit per period and each seller can sell up to 1 unit per period.
• All buyers have a resale value of 100 per unit.
• All sellers have a cost of 0 per unit.
• Buyer earnings = resale value of 100 -purchase price
• Seller earnings = sale price of unit -cost of 0
• Buyers and sellers will be randomly re-shuffled into new markets each period with different buyers and sellers.
• Sellers make a single price offer in each offer round.
• Buyers may observe both sellers' prices or only one, randomly-determined seller's price.
• If buyers decide not to purchase a unit in a round, a die roll will determine whether another round of offers takes place. Another round occurs as long as 10 does not come up on a 10-sided die. This die role takes place every round when at least one buyer has not purchased a unit in the current period. This sequence of 30 periods is similar to sequence 1. As in the previous sequence, each seller has to decide what price to set for a unit of good X and each buyer has to decide the seller from whom to make the purchase. As before, each seller has only 1 unit of good X and each buyer can purchase at most 1 unit. However, in this sequence, each period will last for only one round.
Recall that each time the experiment moves onto another period, the sellers and buyers will be randomly re-shuffled into new three-person groups to form new markets. At the beginning of a new period, sellers start over again with 1 unit of good X that they can sell, and buyers can again purchase 1 (and only 1) unit. Each period proceeds in an identical fashion.
